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Abstract
This paper studies strategic information transmission in a dynamic environment where, each
period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision maker takes an action. Our main
result is that, in contrast to a static environment, full information revelation is possible. The gradual
revelation of information and the eventual full revelation is supported by the dynamic rewards and
punishments. The construction of a fully revealing equilibrium relies on two key features. The
rst feature is that the expert is incentivized, via appropriate actions, to join separable groups in
which she initially pools with far-away types, then later reveals her type. The second feature is the
use of trigger strategies. The decision maker is incentivized by the reward of further information
revelation if he chooses the separation-inducing actions, and the threat of a stop in information
release if he does not. Our equilibrium is non-monotonic. With monotonic partition equilibria, full
revelation is impossible.
Keywords: asymmetric information; cheap talk; dynamic strategic communication; full infor-
mation revelation.
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1 Introduction
The seminal paper on strategic information transmission by Crawford and Sobel (1982) is a model
of choice for a number of applications, ranging from economics and political science, to philosophy
and biology.1 In that paper, a biased and privately informed expert and a decision-maker interact
only once. The conict of interest results in coarse information revelation, and in some cases, in
no information at all. We study strategic information transmission in a dynamic extension of the
Crawford and Sobel setup. Each period the expert sends a message and a decision maker takes
an action. Only the expert knows the state of the world which remains constant over time. We
maintain all other features of the Crawford and Sobel (1982) environment, in particular, that the
interests of the expert and the decision maker di¤er.
There are many environments in which information transmission is dynamic. Many sequential
decisions have to take place, and the decision maker seeks the experts advice prior to each one of
them. The earlier literature on dynamic communication has focused on the role of reputation, see,
for example, Sobel (1985), Morris (2000), and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006), (2006b). Our paper
focuses on the dynamics of strategic communication.
Our most surprising, and di¢ cult to establish nding, is to show that full information revelation
is possible. The construction of the fully revealing equilibrium relies on two key features. The rst is
the use of the separable groups: types which are far apart initially pool together and then separate.
As such, there is gradual revelation of information. The second feature is that the dynamic nature
of the game enables the use of trigger strategies, in which the expert promises better advice in
the future if the decision maker chooses an action benecial for the expert now. That is, the use
of trigger strategies is used to incentivize the decision maker, and to facilitate a gradual release of
information that leads eventually to full revelation.
In a nutshell, in a multi-period interaction, communication can be facilitated by generating
appropriate posteriors and by the use of trigger strategies, whereby the expert employs a signaling
rule, that makes future information revelation credible if his advice is followed early on. We now
provide more details on the roles of separable groups and trigger strategies in our construction of
a fully revealing equilibrium.
We show that, over time, it is possible to divide all states into separable groups. A separable
group is a set of types which are su¢ ciently far apart that each would reveal the truth, rather
than mimic any other type in his group. Therefore, we create histories after which it is common
knowledge that the decision maker puts probability one on a particular separable group, at which
point the types in this group separate. The division of all types into separable groups is quite
delicate, because, given that there is a continuum of types, we need to form a continuum of such
1For a survey with applications across disciplines see Sobel (2008).
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groups. The expert anticipates that if at some point he joins a separable group, then he will forgo
his informational advantage. For the expert to join the separable group containing his true type,
we have to make sure that he does not want to mimic a close-by type, who is supposed to join a
di¤erent separable group. This is done via appropriate separation-inducing actions. The decision-
maker is willing to choose such actions, despite their being non-myopically optimal, because the
expert threatens to babble otherwise.
We emphasize another necessary condition for full information revelation. The fully revealing
equilibrium cannot be a monotonic partition equilibrium. In a monotonic partition equilibrium,
the expert employs a uniform signaling rule where each type sends one message with probability
one, and the set of types that choose the same message is connected. We prove that if attention is
restricted to monotonic partition equilibria, learning stops. Moreover, we argue that non-monotonic
equilibria can be strictly Pareto superior to all dynamic monotonic equilibria. Overall, we conclude
that monotonic partition equilibria constitute a special class of equilibria in our dynamic setup,
whereas this is a canonical class of equilibria in the static setup of Crawford and Sobel (1982).
Non-monotonic (or non-convex) equilibria also play also a prominent role in Baliga and Sj½ostr½om
(2011), who highlight the role of pooling extremists. Such equilibria also appear in Baliga and
Sj½ostr½om (2008), who, building on Baliga and Sj½ostr½om (2004), show how strategic ambiguity can
reduce arm proliferation.
Welfare properties of equilibria are another di¤erence between the dynamic and the static strate-
gic communication games. Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that, under some assumptions, both
the expert and the decision maker ex-ante (before the state is realized) prefer equilibria with higher
number of partitions. We provide an example that shows that it is not necessarily the case for
dynamic equilibria. More partitions of the possible states of the world (i.e. larger number of equi-
librium vectors of actions) do not guarantee higher expected payo¤ for the expert and the decision
maker. The reason is as follows. In the dynamic setup the intertemporal nature of the indi¤erence
conditions that pin down the cuto¤s that characterize partition equilibria allow for a much richer
set of possibilities which overturn the static Pareto comparison results. A similar phenomenon
occurs when the communication is noisy, as shown in an example of the working paper version of
Blume, Board, and Kawamura (2007). In their example, a two-step partition Pareto dominates a
three-step partition. Finally, we present an example in which dynamic monotonic partition equi-
libria can be strictly Pareto superior to playing the most informative one-shot equilibrium in the
rst period, and babbling thereafter.
Our work shows that the nature of dynamic strategic communication is quite distinct from
its static counterpart. In the static case, because of the conict of interest between the decision-
maker and the expert, nearby expert types have an incentive to pool together, precluding full
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information revelation. The single-crossing property also implies that in equilibrium, the action
is a monotonic step function of the state. These two forces make complex signaling (even though
possible) irrelevant, given that it is observationally equivalent to partitional signaling, and imply
that only local incentive compatibility matters. In the dynamic setup the key di¤erence is that
todays communication sets up the stage for tomorrows communication. Complex signaling helps
in the dynamic setup, because it can lead to posteriors where possible states are su¢ ciently far apart
that they have no incentive to mimic each other. Sustaining in equilibrium such posteriors requires
complex signaling where one needs necessarily to worry about global incentive compatibility.
Related Literature
Crawford and Sobel (1982) is the seminal contribution on strategic information transmission.
That paper has inspired an enormous amount of theoretical work and myriads of applications. Here
we study a dynamic extension. Other papers that look at dynamic relations between one expert and
one receiver di¤er from ours because, as already mentioned, their focus is on the senders reputation.
Other papers have a dynamic aspect because they allow for multi-round communication protocols,
but with a single round of action(s). Aumann and Hart (2003) characterize geometrically the
set of equilibrium payo¤s when a long conversation is possible. In that paper, two playersone
informed and one uniformed, play a nite simultaneous move game. The state of the word is nite,
and players engage in direct (no mediator) communications (possibly innitely long exchange of
messages), before both choosing simultaneously costly actions. In contrast, in our model only
the informed party sends cheap messagesthe uniformed party chooses actions and the state is
innite. Krishna and Morgan (2004) add a long communication protocol to Crawford and Sobel
(1982)s game, whereas Goltsman Hoerner, Pavlov and Squintani (2009) characterize such optimal
protocols. Forges and Koessler (2008a, 2008b) allow for a long protocol in a setup where messages
can be certiable. In all those papers once the communication phase is over, the decision maker
chooses one action. In our paper, there are multiple rounds of communication and actions (each
experts message is followed by an action of the decision maker).
In our setup, the dynamic nature of communication enables full information revelation. In
contrast, full information revelation is not possible in the dynamic setup of Andrelini, Gerardi,
and Laguno¤ (2008) who consider dynamic strategic communication is a dynastic game and show
that if preferences are not fully aligned full learningequilibria do not exist. Renault, Solan, and
Vieille (2011) examine dynamic sender-receiver games, in a setup where the information is not fully
persistent and the state is nite. They restrict attention to Markov equilibria and characterize
the set of equilibrium payo¤s. In contrast, we assume fully persistent information and a state
drawn from a continuum, and focus mainly on non-markovian equilibria. Ivanov (2011) allows for
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a dynamic communication protocol in a setup where the expert is also initially uninformed and the
decision maker controls the quality of information available to the expert.
Our model bears some similarities to the static strategic communication with multiple receivers.
In those models the expert cares about a sequence of actions, but in contrast to our model, those
actions are chosen by di¤erent individuals. An important di¤erence is that in our model the receiver
cares about the entire vector of actions chosen, compared to those models where each receiver cares
only about his own action. Still, some of the properties of the equilibria that we obtain also
appear in the models with multiple receivers. For example, our non-monotonic example presented
in Section 4 resembles Example 2 of Goltzman and Pavlov (2008). It is also similar to Example 2
in Krishna and Morgan (2004).2
Full information revelation is possible in other variations of the Crawford and Sobel (1982)
setup: When the decision maker consults two experts as in Battaglini (2002), Eso and Fong (2008)
and Ambrus and Lu (2010);3 when information is completely or partially certiable, as in Mathis
(2008); and when there are lying costs and the state is unbounded as in Kartik, Ottaviani and
Squintani (2007). In the case of multiple experts, playing one against the other is the main force
that supports truthful revelation. In the case of an unbounded state, lying costs become large and
support the truth. In the case of certiable information, one can exploit the fact that messages are
state-contingent to induce truth telling. All these forces are very di¤erent from the forces behind
our fully revealing construction.
2 The Environment
We extend the classical model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) to a dynamic setting. There are two
players: an Expert - E (sender) and a Decision Maker - DM (receiver) who interact for nitely many
periods t = 1; :::; T . The expert knows the state of the world  2 [0; 1] which is constant over time
and is distributed according to the c.d.f. F . At the beginning of each period t, the expert sends
a (possibly random) message mt which depends on the realization of the state  to the decision
maker. The decision maker then updates his beliefs about the state and chooses an action yt 2 R
that a¤ects both playerspayo¤s. There is a conict of interest because, for all states , the experts
ideal choice of action di¤ers from the decision makers. This is captured by a scalar b; the bias
parameter of the expert. The discount factor of the expert and the decision maker is i 2 [0; 1]
for i 2 fE;DMg: When the state is  and the decision maker chooses actions yT = (y1; ::; yT ), the
experts payo¤ is given by




2Equilibria can be non-monotonic also in environments where the decision maker consults two experts as in
Krishna and Morgan (2001).
3But full information is not possible in the setup of Levy and Razin (2007).
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and the decision makers payo¤ is given by




We assume that period payo¤s uE(yt; ) and uDM (yt; ; b) satisfy the conditions imposed by Craw-
ford and Sobel (1982), namely that (i) ui is twice di¤erentiable, for all ; (ii) @u
i(y;)
@y = 0 for some y
for i 2 fE;DMg; (iii) that @
2ui(:;:)
@y2
< 0; and (iv) a single crossing condition,@
2ui(:;:)
@@y > 0. Conditions
(ii) and (iii) guarantee a unique maximum in y.
Let yDM () and yE() denote, respectively, the decision makers and the experts most preferred
action when the true state  is known by both players . The single crossing condition ensures that
yDM () and yE() are increasing in . We assume that, regardless of the state , a conict of
interest exists: yDM () 6= yE(), for all .
The decision maker observes his payo¤s only at the end of the game. He does not observe his
payo¤ at each period t. Otherwise, the problem would be trivial because the decision maker can
learn the experts information by simply inverting his payo¤.
A strategy prole  = (i)i=E;DM , species a strategy for each player. Let ht denote a history
that contains all the reports submitted by the expert mt 1 = (m1; :::;mt 1), and all actions chosen
by the decision maker yt 1 = (y1; :::; yt 1) up to, but not to including stage t. The set of all
feasible histories at t is denoted by Ht. A behavioral strategy of the expert, E ; consists of a
sequence of signaling rules that map [0; 1] Ht to a probability distribution over reportsM. Let
q(m j; ht ) denote the probability that the expert reports message m at history ht when his type
is . A strategy for the decision maker, DM , is a sequence of maps from Ht to actions. We use
yt(m jht ) 2 R to denote the action that the decision maker chooses at ht given a report m: A
belief system, , maps Ht to the set of probability distributions over [0; 1]: Let F (jht) denote the
decision makers beliefs about the expertss type after a history ht, t = 1; :::; T: A strategy prole
 and a belief system  is an assessment. We seek strategy proles and belief systems that form
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, (PBE).
In the paper we use the terminology as follows.
Denition 1 An equilibrium is called babbling if for all m with q(m j; ht ) > 0; all  2 [0; 1], all
ht and t; we have that yt(m jht ) = ŷ:
In other words, we call an equilibrium babbling, if the same action is induced with probability
one for all states  2 [0; 1] and all t 2 T:
Denition 2 We call a signaling rule q uniform, if q(m j; ht ) is uniform, with support on [i; i+1]
if  2 [i; i+1]:
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Denition 3 A partition equilibrium is one in which, at each period t and history ht; the expert
employs only uniform signaling rules.
In other words, at a partition equilibrium, the expert follows a pure strategy in which, for any
message m, the set of types sending message m is connected.
Denition 4 An equilibrium is fully revealing if there exists a T̂  T such that after all histories
along the equilibrium path leading to T̂ ; the expert sends for all  2 [0; 1] a di¤erent message with
probability one, inducing yt() =  from t = T̂ on.
3 Uniform Signaling
We rst briey summarize the static cheap talk game of Crawford and Sobel (1982) in which
uniform signaling rules are the canonical form of communication in static games. We then study
properties of uniform signaling in our dynamic setup.
3.1 The Canonical Static Communication
We start by reviewing the Crawford and Sobel (1982) ndings. For the static communication
and decision game they show that all equilibria are equivalent to partition equilibria. The expert
employs simple uniform signaling rules. He follows a pure strategy in which, for any message m,
the set of types sending message m is connected. This type of communication induces actions
which are increasing step functions of the state. Hence, intervals of types pool together by sending
the same message, ultimately, inducing the same action by the decision maker. This implies that
communication is coarse. Even though the state  takes a continuum of values, only nitely many
di¤erent actions are induced.
The intuition behind this result can be summarized as follows. Fix an equilibrium of the one-
shot game and let y() denote an action induced when the state is . The conict of interest between
the expert and the decision maker (yDM () 6= yE(), for all ) implies that there are at most nitely
many actions induced. The fact that uE is strictly concave in y, together with single-crossing and
the niteness of actions, implies that there are at most nitely many states  where the expert is
indi¤erent between two induced actions. Then, y() can be, without loss of generality, taken to
be single-valued. Because y takes at most nitely many values, it is an increasing step function.
The state space is divided into a nite number of subintervals, and y takes a di¤erent value in
each subinterval. Importantly, Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that, without loss of generality,
equilibrium induced actions, y can be taken to arise from uniform signaling rules. This result
follows from the observation that all messages inducing the same action y can be replaced by a
single message. Therefore, more complex signaling rules play no role in the static setup.
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3.2 Uniform Signaling: A Special Kind of Dynamic Communication
We now focus on simple partitional communication protocols (uniform signalling) and study their
properties in our dynamic setup. We show two results. The rst result is that with monotonic
partition equilibria the decision maker never learns the truth. The second result establishes that
when the bias is so large that only one action is induced at an equilibrium of the static game,
the same is true also in dynamic monotonic partition equilibria. Finally, an example shows that
dynamic partitions can di¤er and can be more informative compared to static ones.
In constructing partition equilibria, the main di¤erence from the static case is that the experts
indi¤erence conditions that characterize the cuto¤s of the partitions are intertemporal. This makes
the explicit solution of the resulting di¤erence equation di¢ cult even in simple environments, such
as in the uniform quadratic loss case. To overcome this di¢ culty, we notice that at some point in
the game the experts indi¤erence conditions reduce to the static ones and then apply the results
of Crawford and Sobel (1982).
Using this approach, we rst show that among the class of monotonic partition equilibria, there
exists no equilibrium in which the decision maker eventually learns the state of the world for all
 2 [0; 1]. That is, there exist no fully revealing equilibria.
Proposition 1 For all T , there exist no fully revealing monotonic partition equilibria.
This result follows almost immediately from Crawford and Sobel (1982). A short sketch of
the argument is as follows. First, note that by denition, in a fully revealing monotonic partition
equilibrium, there must exist a period in the game at which a continuum of possible actions is
induced. Now, suppose by contradiction that there exists such an equilibrium. Then, there exists a
period T̂  T in which the last subdivision occurs, with yt() = , for all t  T̂ . At T̂ the experts
indi¤erence condition reduces to the static one. Since yt () =  (respectively yt ( + ") =  + ")
from T̂ onwards then:
T   T̂

 + 2 + :::+ T T̂





 + 2 + :::+ T T̂

uE (yt ( + ") ; ) ;
and similarly for state  + ". These conditions are equivalent to the static conditions in Crawford
and Sobel (1982), who proved that they imply that at most nitely many actions can be induced
at an equilibrium of a static game, a contradiction to full revelation.
We now proceed to show that if all static equilibria are equivalent to babbling then all dynamic
monotonic partition equilibria are equivalent to babbling.
Proposition 2 If all static equilibria are equivalent to the babbling equilibrium, then all dynamic
monotonic partition equilibria are equivalent to babbling.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
It is also easy to see that the payo¤s of both the expert and the decision maker of any static
equilibrium can be achieved as a per period payo¤s in the dynamic communication game. We can
construct an equivalent(in terms of payo¤s) dynamic equilibrium as follows: In the rst period,
all types follow the same strategies as in the static equilibrium. For all t > 1 experts of all types
babble, and the decision maker repeats the same action she took in period 1. It is trivial to verify
that these strategies constitute an equilibrium.
In Appendix B, we show an example when in our dynamic setup (T = 2) both players can be
strictly better-o¤ compared to the best static equilibrium. In that example, E = DM = 1, the
state is uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and preferences satisfy
uE(y; ) =   (y      b)2 and uDM (y; ; b) =   (y   )2 ; (1)
with b = 112 . At the most informative static equilibrium the state space is divided in two sub-
intervals: [0; 13 ] and [
1




6 : We show that when T = 2, there exists
a partition equilibrium where the state space is divided ultimately in three sub-intervals: [0; 0:25];
[0:25; 0:45833] and [0:458 33; 1].
However, in dynamic settings it is also possible to have equilibria with more partitions that
are inferior to ones with less (we present an example of such an equilibrium in Appendix C). This
happens because a larger ultimate number of partitions may require extensive pooling earlier on,
inducing overall lower welfare. This nding is in contrast to Crawford and Sobel (1982), who show
that under their Assumption M equilibria can be easily Pareto ranked: both the expert and the
decision maker ex-ante (before the state is realized) prefer the equilibrium with the highest number
of partitions and actions induced.4 Our ndings suggest that Pareto comparisons in dynamic cases
are less straightforward, even if we restrict attention to monotonic partitional equilibria.
We proceed to study the role of complex signalling in our dynamic game.
4 An Example with Complex Signaling and Dynamic Information
Revelation
In this section we present an example where the expert employs a complex signalling rule that
induces an action of the decision maker that is not monotonic in the state. We show that, for a
range of biases, this equilibrium is superior to all monotonic ones.
In the example below, the bias is so severe that if communication and the decision were static
4The equilibrium with the largest number of partitions is the only equilibrium that satises the no incentive to
separate(NITS) condition (Chen, Kartik and Sobel (2008)).
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(one round), as in Crawford and Sobel (1982), all equilibria are equivalent to babbling. We show,
that even in these extreme bias situations, some information is released even with two rounds. This
equilibrium has the feature that the decision maker learns the state quite precisely when the news
is either horric, or terric, but remains agnostic for intermediate levels.
Example 1 Dynamic equilibria can be non-monotonic
Consider the two period example where E = DM = 1, types are uniformly distributed on [0; 1]
and preferences are given by (1). Let the expert use the signaling rule as follows.
In period 1, the expert for states in [0; )[ (; 1] sends a message m1(1) with probability 1. For
states in [; ], he sends a message m1(2) with probability 1.
In period 2, the expert adopts the following signaling rule. For states in [0; ) the expert sends
a message m2(1) with probability 1, for states in [; ] he sends a message m2(2) with probability
1, and for states in (; 1] he sends a message m2(3) with probability 1. To sum up, we look for an
equilibrium with the following signaling rule:
types in [0; ) send message sequence A = (m1(1);m2(1));
types in [; ] send message sequence B = (m1(2);m2(2));
types in (; 1] send message sequence C = (m1(1);m2(3)):
With this signaling rule, the optimal actions of the decision maker for periods 1 and 2 are, respec-
tively, given by:
t = 1 : y1(1) =
2   2 + 1















After any out of equilibrium message the decision maker assigns probability 1 to the state belonging
to [; ], inducing an action equal to yout = +

2 : With these out-of equilibrium beliefs no type of
the expert has an incentive to send an out-of-equilibrium message.
In order for this to be an equilibrium, type  must be indi¤erent between message sequence A
and B:
 ( 
2   2 + 1
2(    + 1)
     b)2   (
2
     b)2 =  2( +

2
     b)2 (2)
and type  must be indi¤erent between message sequence B and C :
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 ( 
2   2 + 1
2(    + 1)
     b)2   (1 +

2
     b)2 =  2( +

2
     b)2: (3)
At t = 2 it must also be the case that type  prefers m2(1) to m2(3), and the reverse for type :
 (
2
     b)2   (1 +

2




     b)2   (
2
     b)2: (5)
A solution of the system of equations (2) and (3) gives an equilibrium if 0   <   1: We solved
this system numerically and found that the highest bias that makes this non-monotonic equilibrium
survive is b = 0:256. For b = 0:256, we obtain  = 0:0581;  = 0:9823. The corresponding optimal
actions for period 1 are: y1(1) = 0:253; y1(2) = 0:52; and for period 2 are: y2(1) = 0:029; y2(2) = 0:52;
y2(3) = 0:991: The rst period action is non-monotonic. It is straightforward to check that the
indi¤erence conditions (2) and (3) su¢ ce for global incentive compatibility.5
An important feature of the constructed non-monotonic equilibrium is that it exists even though
the only monotonic partition equilibrium in this (dynamic) game is a trivial babbling equilibrium.
For bias b = 0:256, the only equilibrium in the static game is babbling. Proposition 2 then implies
that the only monotonic equilibrium in the dynamic game is babbling. At this equilibrium the
decision maker takes the action yB = 0:5. The experts and the decision makers expected disutilities
are respectively given by:  0:298 and  0:167. Both the expert and the decision maker are strictly
better-o¤ at our non-monotonic equilibrium, where the disutilities are given by  0:275 for the
expert and by  0:144 for the decision maker, compared to the most informative static equilibrium.
This example highlights how complex signalling can lead to better communication in a multi-
stage games. By pooling together the best and the worst states at t = 1; the expert is willing at
t = 2 to reveal whether the state is very good or very bad. It also has the following implication.
Proposition 3 There exists non-monotonic equilibria that are Pareto superior to all monotonic
partition equilibria.
Given that for preferences given by (1) and b > 0:25; the only equilibrium in the static game is
babbling, this Proposition follows immediately from the preceding discussion.
We now construct a non-monotonic equilibrium with even higher welfare properties. The key
is to allow the expert to condition his future communication of the previously chosen action of the
decision maker. We call such strategies trigger strategies.
5 In other words, we need to check that all types in [0; 0:058) prefer message sequence A; types in [0:058; 0:982]
prefer message sequence B and types in (0:982; 1] prefer message sequence C: A way to do that is to graph U(A; ) 
U(B; ) and U(B; ) U(C; ) and verify that U(A; ) U(B; ) > 0 for all  2 [0; 0:058); whereas U(A; ) U(B; ) < 0
for  > 0:0580; and that U(B; )  U(C; ) > 0 for all  < 0:982; whereas U(B; )  U(C; ) < 0 for all  > 0:982:
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Now the expert uses the following signalling rule: if the state is in [0; 0:0642] [ [0:9919; 1] he
tells the DM at t = 1 to choose 0:2615 and to choose 0:528 otherwise. The rst action is above
the myopic best response, which is y1(1) =
2 2+1
2( +1) = 0:14008: If the DM chooses the action
recommended by the expert, then the expert at t = 2 reveals whether the state is [0; 0:0642]
or [0:9919; 1]; otherwise, the expert threatens to babble. It is routine to check that this is an
equilibrium. Moreover, at this equilibrium, the expert and the decision maker are even better o¤
compared to our original non-monotonic equilibrium. Their disutilities are respectively given by:
 0:2674 for the expert and by  0:1409 for the decision maker. The reason for the improvement, is
that relying on a threat, we relax the best response constraint of the decision maker which increases
the expected payo¤ of expert and, as a consequence, that of the decision maker (since their ex ante
expected payo¤s di¤er by b2).
Our main result in the section that follows is that the dynamic set-up correlates the incentives
of the expert and DM in such a way that full information revelation is possible. We present this
next.
5 Main Result: Full information revelation in dynamic cheap talk
games
One of the most stark results of the static strategic communication game is that there is no equi-
librium with full information revelation. Although the state can take a continuum of values, the
expert sends at most nitely many signals to the decision maker. That is, substantial amount of
information is not transmitted. In this section, for our dynamic strategic communication model we
construct an equilibrium that is fully revealing. The construction of the equilibrium relies on two
tools: the use of separable groups, and the use of trigger strategies. These tools have no leverage
in single-round communications, but are powerful in dynamic communications.
5.1 Simple Case: Learning the Truth when the Expert is Myopic
We rst show how to construct a fully-revealing equilibrium when the expert is myopic. The example
shows how we use separable groups of far away agents who mimic each other but not the nearby
types. In the case of the myopic expert, there is no need to use trigger strategies which we introduce
in the example of the patient expert.
There are two essential ingredients of this example. First, the set of types that choose the same
message at t = 1 are su¢ ciently far apart so they can be separated at t = 2. That is, each message
is chosen by a separable group of types (a group of types which are apart). Second, the average of
types in each group is constant. The rst period action is then at. Irrespective of the state, all
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experts induce the same action. This implies that the expert does not care which group he joins
(since a myopic expert cares only about the 1st-period action, which is constant across groups).
Example 2 Fully revealing equilibrium with impatient experts (E = 0).
Consider the uniform quadratic loss case as in (1) when the bias is b < 116 and T = 2. The
expert is impatient (E = 0). The construction works for any discount factor for the decision maker.
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= 0:5 for all ~" 2 (0; 1
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):
In period 2, the expert tells the truth, inducing an action equal to the state. After any out-of-
equilibrium message at t = 1, the decision maker assigns equal probability to all states, leading to
action yout = 0:5. After any out-of-equilibrium message at t = 2, the decision maker believes that
the state is equal to the smallest state that is possible, leading to an action equal to yout = 0.
If the expert is impatient (E = 0), then for any b < 116 we argue that this is an equilibrium.
First, notice that all messages (even out-of-equilibrium ones) induce the same action at t = 1.
Hence, at least from the t = 1 perspective, all types of the experts are indi¤erent among them. Now
consider, for example, the history afterm" was chosen at stage 1. At this history the posterior of the
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then after each of these messages, the decision maker chooses
y(m2(k)) = k:
To see that at t = 2 the expert has no incentive to deviate, we consider, for instance, type  = 38 +"
and show that he does not have incentive to mimic type  + 18 :
 (      b)2 >  ( + 1
8







which is satised if b < 116 . A similar argument holds for other types. Additionally, any out-
of equilibrium message at t = 2; leads to yout = 0 which is always worse than y2() =  since
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 b2   (b+ )2 for all  2 [0; 1]: The situation after a message m~" is analogous.
This construction does not apply when the expert is patient, because it does not provide the
expert with incentives to join the rightseparable group as we discuss below. We turn to the case
of a patient expert next.
5.2 Full Information Revelation with a Patient Expert
The main contribution of the paper is to construct a fully revealing equilibrium when the expert is
patient.
Theorem 1 Suppose that expert = DM = 1 and that the preferences of the expert and of the
decision maker are given by (1) : For any bias b  161 ; there is an innite set of priors F , and a
horizon T ; for which a fully revealing equilibrium exists whenever T  T :
We provide a sketch of the proof and leave the details to the appendix.
There are two key constructs in the proof.
The rst is the use of the separable groups as in the case of the myopic expert above. Rather
than having intervals of types pool together we construct pairs of far-away types who pool together
in the initial periods. The advantage is that we no longer need to worry about these paired types
mimicking nearby types after they join the separable group. Their only options are to tell the truth,
or to mimic each other. Of course, an important part of the proof is to ensure that these paired
types indeed would prefer to join the right separable group. In our construction for a myopic
expert, the induced action in the rst period, u (), was at as the experts incentives were static.
In fact, that proof relied only on constructing separable groups without the use of trigger strategies.
For the case of the patient expert, the construction of the separable groups is signicantly more
involved as it has to take into account the dynamic incentives. In particular, the actions that the
decision maker takes in the initial stages cannot be at. If the expert cares about the future, and,
say the rst-period action is at, the expert will join the initial separable group that leads to the
best future action. Hence, for a patient expert, we need to choose initial action functions which
provide incentives to join the truthful separable group. If type  knows that some type 0 will get
a more favorable action in the revelation phase, then type s group must induce an initial action
which is more favorable to type  than that induced by (0)s group.
The second key part of the construction is the use of the trigger strategies. The need for the
trigger strategies is closely related to the construction of the separable groups. In the revelation
stage the decision maker gets rewarded as the experts reveal themselves. However, this revelation is
obviously costly for the expert. To induce the expert to separate at the revelation stage the earlier
actions taken by the decision maker have to provide appropriate rewards to the expert. These
14
expert-incentivizing action functions turn out to be incompatible with the myopically optimal
actions from the DMs perspective. Therefore, to make the DM cooperate with the equilibrium,
we need to use trigger strategies. The expert threatens that if the DM rejects his early advice, the
expert will stop revealing information. If the DM follows experts advice, DM will be rewarded
with eventual full revelation of the state.
Before we proceed with the proof, it is useful to simplify notation and work with a scaled type
space by dividing all actions and types by b. When we say that type  2 [0; 1b ] recommends
u() in period 1, for disutility (u()     1)2, we mean that (in the unscaled type space) type b
recommends action u()b; for disutility (u()b  b  b)2 = b2 (u()     1)2.
We rst partition the scaled type space [0; 1b ] into four intervals, with endpoints [0; 1; 2; 3;
1
b ].
The separable groups are as follows. At time t = 1, each type  2 [0; 1] is paired and initially
pools with a partner g() 2 [2; 3]; to recommend a sequence of actions (u1(); u2()). If the DM
follows both recommendations, then types f; g()g separate at time T   2: Each type  2 [1; 2]
is paired and initially pools with a partner h() 2 [3; 4]; to recommend a sequence of actions
(v1(); v2()) ; who then reveal the truth at time T    if the DM has previously followed all
recommendations. If the DM does not follow any advice and chooses a di¤erent action then the
one recommended by the expert, the expert never reveals the truth after the deviation by the DM.
For the purpose of the outline of the proof, take the endpoints 1; 2; 3 as given, along with
the partner functions g : [0; 1] ! [2; 3]; h : [1; 2] ! [3; 4]; and recommendation functions
u1; u2; v1; v2. In the appendix, we derive the parameters and functions that work, and provide the
full details of how to construct fully revealing equilibria.
We now describe the strategy for the expert and for the decision maker. For notational purposes
it is useful to further subdivide the experts into three groups: I, II, and III.
At time t = 1, there are then three groups of experts. Group I consists of types I 2 [1; 2]













2 [2; 3] who
are not in Group II . In other words, we divided the types in interval [0; 1] and their counterparts
g () 2 [2; 3] into two groups: Group II and Group III: Group IIconsists of all types whose rst-
period messages coincide with those of a Group I pair, and Group III consists of all remaining
types in [0; 1] [ [2; 3]:6
6As explained in the appendix (Section 12.2.1 and the two paragraphs leading up to it), it is impossible to
construct a fully revealing equilibrium if all information sets at t = 0 contain only two types: the DM would, at some
such information sets, necessarily have an incentive to deviate. We get around this problem by making sure that each
recommendation sent by a Group I pair (where the DMs IC constraint may be violated) is also sent by a Group II
pair (where the DMs IC constraint is satised); Group III simply consists of all remaining agents.
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From time t = 1 up to time7 t = 20 the experts make recommendations and the decision





















. Importantly, the recommendations
for the types in Group I and Group II coincide: for every I in Group I, there exists II in








. This is the reason why we for the ease of exposition have a
subdivison into Group II and III. Upon observing these recommendations for this period, the
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. We also need to specify what happens for the o¤-path recommendation 
the DM treats it as a mistake and believes he faces a group






the appendix for the exact details).
At t = 20, the decision maker separates three groups I, II, III. Group I recommends the
action v2. Groups II and III continue with the recommendation u1. The beliefs of the DM then



















These recommendations continue up to time t = 2a (in Lemma D7.1, we will specify 2a  20).
At t = 2a  20, Group II and III switch to the recommendation u2. Group I continues
recommending action v2. There is no additional revelation of information here. The switch to
action u2 is needed (we will expand on this below) to ensure that the correct separable groups were
chosen at time t = 1.




. That is, from time t = T   




. Note that the function h () is chosen
to have a property j   h () j  2 to ensure separation in this revelation stage.8 In the appendix,
we show that  depends on the horizon T and approaches T as the bias b gets close to zero.
At time T  2, types in Group II and III get separated. That is, from time t = T  2 to time T








. Note that from time 20
Groups II and Group III were already separated (but the types within each respective group still
were pooled). At time T   2 the nal separation of the paired types occurs. Note that the function
g () is chosen to have a property j   g () j  2 to ensure separation in this revelation stage.
The strategies of the expert switch to babbling if at any time the decision maker does not follow
any prescriptions by the expert (the details are in the appendix).
7We have time denoted by 20 and, subsequently, by 2a to be consistent with the construction in the appendix.
8We have 2 on the right hand side because we operate in the type space rescaled by b.
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To summarize  there are three key phases. The initial phase is at time t = 1 is when the
types are paired and choose their separable groups. The second stage is information transmission
in which the experts give recommendation (u1; u2) and (v1; v2). In these phases, the DM refrains
from taking the myopically optimal option and sticks to the prescribed recommendations in order
to be rewarded at the revelation phase. One can think of these two stages loosely as providing the
correct incentives for the expert to join the separable groups. The third stage is revelation stage in
which the paired types separate.
Finally, we briey comment on the construction of the functions (u1; u2) and (v1; v2) which
are given parametrically in the appendix. They are designed such that the following incentive
constraints are satised.9 The rst set of constraints can be thought of as local incentive compat-
ibility constraintsthat is, those applying within each type s interval [i; i+1]: These (dynamic)
incentive compatibility constraints ensure that, say, the agent  2 [0; 1] prefers to induce actions






prescribed for some other type 0 in the same interval [0; 1]. That is, the ones applying within the
interval [0; 1] (and, respectively, for the paired types g () in [2; 3]) or within the interval [1; 2]
(and, respectively, for the paired types h () in [3; 1=b]). These (dynamic) incentive compatibility
constraints ensure that, say, the agent  2 [0; 1] prefers to follow actions u1,u2 and then to reveal
its type (analogously, this should be true for this experts counterpart and for the experts in other
intervals and their counterparts. The second and third set of constraints and the conditions imposed
on the recommendation functions can be thought of as (global) incentive compatibility constraints,
ensuring that types in each respective Group I, Group II, and Group III do not want to mimic
a type in another group. That is, the expert does not want to deviate across the intervals. As
explained in the appendix, this boils down to two conditions: our second constraint requires that
each endpoint type be indi¤erent between his two possible equilibrium sequences (for example, type
1 must be indi¤erent between recommending u1(1); u2(1); then revealing the truth at time T  2;
and recommending v1(1); v2(1); then revealing the truth at time T   ): Our third constraint re-
quires that the average action be increasing in ; for all  : this must hold both within each interval
(relates to a second-order convexity condition), and at the discontinuity points 1; 2; 3 (relates to
the requirement that, while i is indi¤erent between the sequences prescribed at the right endpoint
of [i 1; i] and the left endpoint of [i; i+1]; all types below i prefer the rst sequence, all types
above i prefer the second).10
9Of course, the endpoints (1; 2; 3), the pairing functions g and h, and the functions (u1; u2) and (v1; v2) have
to be constructed simultaneously as we do in the appendix.
10The reason we need two actions prior to revelation of the truth (u1; u2 or v1; v2) is that with just one function
(say u or v); the requirement that each type send the same initial recommendation as at least one other partner,
turns out to be incompatible with the local and global IC constraints (in particular, the requirement that type
 nd the initial action of type  + " less attractive than his own, yet the average action is increasing whenever
discontinuous). Two actions give us more exibility, since, for example, to make type  + "s sequence unattractive
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The natural question arises: why do we need more than one reward phases? The reason is as
follows. In order to ultimately achieve full-information revelation the expert types must voluntarily
join separable groups, revealing some information. Suppose that we only had one reward phase. If
the decision maker uses the information released up to that point to choose his action, then the
expert would not nd it optimal to join the separable group. In other words, rewards su¢ cient to
incentivize the expert require the decision maker to choose an action that di¤ers from the myopic
best response. In order, then for the deviation to the myopic best response not to be attractive,
it must be the case that the DM remains su¢ ciently agnostic about the state of the world. This
is achieved by having two separable pairs of types pool together during phase 1 and then breaking
into to two pairs in phase 2. At the beginning of the second phase, the reward to the expert is
smaller because the division to separable pairs has already occurred. Put it di¤erently, the reason
why one need to have two actions u1 and u2 is to ensure that there is indi¤erence at the endpoints,
and that the average action is increasing. Having only one action (say, u1) will only ensure that
condition the indi¤erence at the endpoints is satised.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper shows that dynamic strategic communication di¤ers from its static counterpart. Our
most striking result is that fully revealing equilibria exist. We also presented a series of examples
that show how the canonical results of the static strategic communication games may not hold in
the dynamic settings.
The main novel ingredient of our model is that there are many (nite) rounds of communication
and after each round an action is chosen. The dynamic considerations of the expert allow us to
group together types that are far apart, forming separable groups which is the key ingredient
behind the construction of fully revealing equilibria and of non-monotonic equilibria. The dynamic
setup of our model also allows us to use trigger strategies.
Our analysis highlights the nature of incentive compatibility in dynamic incentive settings. One
important characteristic is that dynamic incentive constraints can bind for a disconnected set of
types. Moreover, the fact that posteriors are endogenous, implies that earlier rounds in the game
can be used to induce posteriors that eventually allow the decision maker to learn the truth. At
those nodes in the game the information rents of the expert disappear.
The forces that we identify can be present in other dynamic environments where there is asym-
metric information and limited commitment as to what will happen later in the game. Think, for
example, a dynamic contracting environment where there is limited commitment about the future,
to type  we can either move it further away from type s bliss point, or increase the variance by pulling the rst
two recommendations further apart.
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or, more generally, a dynamic mechanism design problem, or some other dynamic game where one
imposes the requirement of sequential rationality. In those models as well, past behavior setups the
stage for future behavior because posteriors are endogenous. And, in contrast to the vast majority
of the recent literature on dynamic mechanisms design,11 one needs to worry about global incentive
compatibility despite the fact that stage payo¤s satisfy the single-crossing property.
11 In recent years motivated by the large number and the importance of applications there has been substantial
work on dynamic mechanism design. See, for example, the survey of Bergemann and Said (2010), and the references




A Proof of Proposition 2
When we restrict attention to monotonic partition equilibria there will be some point in the game
where the last subdivision of an interval into smaller partitions occurs. This can either happen at
the last period, or at some period before last. Assume without loss, that one interval is partitioned
into two inducing actions y1 (m1) and y2 (m2) : If it happens in the last period T of the game, then
the indi¤erence condition of the expert type - call that type ̂- that is indi¤erent between y1 and
y2 is the static one. But then, if a subinterval of the original state space can divided into two, it
cannot be the case that all static equilibria are equivalent babbling. This follows by Corollary 1 of
Crawford and Sobel (1982)).
Now, suppose that the last subdivision happens at a period before the last. Say at period T̂ :
Given that no further subdivision occurs after T̂ ; when the expert sends a message that induces y1
(resp. y2) at T̂ the same action is induced for the remaining number of periods T   T̂ : Then the
















which is equivalent to static. But then, as before, this subdivision at T̂ is not possible given that
all static equilibria are equivalent babbling.
Observe that all the arguments in this proof go through even if we allow for trigger strategies.
This is because at the point where the last subdivision occurs, it is impossible to incentivize the
decision maker to do something worse than his myopic best response. To see this, note at that
point, either the game ends - when T̂ = T , so there is no time to reward the decision maker for
choosing a suboptimal action at T or T̂ < T: Suppose that T̂ < T; and assume without loss,
that one interval is partitioned into two inducing actions ~y1 (m1) and ~y2 (m2) and suppose that ~y1
generates a payo¤ for the DM di¤erent from the myopic best response y1; then in order for the DM













uDM (y1; ) jm1

;
which contradicts the fact that y1 is the myopic best response given m1: Hence, the DM cannot
choose actions that give him a payo¤ di¤erent from the payo¤ at the myopic best response. This
together with the strict concavity of uDM imply that y1 = ~y1:
B Monotonic partition equilibria with more partitions
Suppose that E = DM = 1; types are uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and preferences satisfy (1).
Suppose that bias b = 112 : Using standard arguments, one can establish that game has only two
equilibria,12 a babbling equilibrium and an equilibrium with two partitions, where the space is
divided in two sub-intervals: [0; 13 ] and [
1




6 : Now we show that when
12The largest number of subintervals that the type space can be divided into is the largest integer that satises
 2bp2 + 2bp+ 1 > 0; (6)












and where hxi denotes the smallest integer greater than or equal to x:
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T = 2, there exists a monotonic partition equilibrium where in the end the state space is divided
in three sub-intervals.
We look for an equilibrium with the following signaling rule:
types in [0; 1] send message sequence A = (m1(1);m2(1));
types in [1; 2] send message sequence B = (m1(2);m2(2));
types in [2; 1] send message sequence C = (m1(2);m2(3)):
With this signaling rule in the rst period the interval [0; 1] is partitioned into [0; 1] and [1; 1].



















The second period actions induced are y2(1) =
1








3 ; whereas the
rst period actions induced are y1(1) =
1
2 and y1(2) =
1+1
2 :
After any out-of- equilibrium message the decision maker assigns probability one to the state
belonging in [0; 1] inducing yout = 12 : With these out-of equilibrium beliefs it is immediate to see
that no type has an incentive to send an out-of-equilibrium message.





















which with the help of (8) gives us 3 partitions with cuto¤s 1 = 0:25 and in turn 2 = 0:458 33:
Using this value of 1 we get that: y1(1) = y2(1) = 0:125; y1(2) = 0:625; y2(2) = 0:35417 and
y2(3) = 0:72917:
In constructing this strategy prole we have imposed that type 2 is indi¤erent between inducing
action y2(2) and y2(3) at t = 2 and that type 1 is indi¤erent between inducing action sequence y1(1)
and y2(1) and y1(2) and y2(2): Now we want to verify that these conditions are su¢ cient for global
incentive compatibility. At t = 2 the game is isomorphic to the static one, where the fact that
2 is indi¤erent between y2(2) and y2(3) implies that all types above 2 prefer y2(3) and all types
below 2 prefer y2(2): To verify that types below 1 prefer message sequence A inducing y1(1) and
y2(1); and types above 1 prefer message sequence B inducing y1(2) and y2(2); we plot the di¤erence
U(A; )  U(B; ) and show that it is positive for all  < 1 and negative for  > 1 :







At the dynamic equilibrium we constructed here the experts welfare is  0:065 and the decision
makers welfare is given by  0:0517, which are both higher than the welfare at the equilibrium
where the most informative static equilibrium is played in the rst period, and babbling in the
second, which are respectively  0:069 and  0:055:
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C Pareto comparisons of dynamic cheap talk equilibria
The following examples demonstrate that equilibria with more partitions can be Pareto inferior to
the equilibria with fewer partitions
Take E = DM = 1 and b = 0:08; and consider the most informative static partition equilibrium
where the number of partitions is p = 3: At this equilibrium the state space is divided into [0; 0:013];
[0:013; 0:347] and [0:347; 1]. The corresponding optimal actions of the decision maker are given by
y1 = 0:0067 y2 = 0:18 y3 = 0:673;
from which we can calculate the ex-ante expected utility levels for the expert  0:032 and for the
decision maker  0:0263. Then, at the equilibrium of the dynamic game where the most informative
static equilibrium is played at t = 1 and babbling thereafter, the total expected utility is  0:065
for the expert, and  0:053 for the decision maker.
We now construct a dynamic equilibrium where the type space is subdivided into more subin-
tervals, but both playersex-ante expected payo¤s are lower. We look for an equilibrium with the
following signaling rule:
types in [0; 1] send message sequence (m1(1);m2(1))
types in [1; 2] send message sequence (m1(2);m2(2))
types in [2; 3] send message sequence (m1(2);m2(3))
types in [3; 1] send message sequence (m1(3);m2(4)):
So types are partitioned into four intervals in stage 2, but in stage 1, the types in [1; 2] and
[2; 3] pool together to send the same message m1(2): Since the signaling rule does not depend
on the decision makers action at stage 1, the decision maker will choose the following myopically
optimal actions:


















After any out-of-equilibrium message the decision maker assigns probability one to the state
belonging in [0; 1] inducing yout = 12 : With these out-of-equilibrium beliefs it is immediate to see
that no type has an incentive to deviate.
In equilibrium, type 1 is indi¤erent between action sequences fy1(1); y2(1)g and fy1(2); y2(2)g;
type 2 is indi¤erent between 2nd-period actions y2(2) and y2(3); and type 3 is indi¤erent between
action sequences fy1(2); y2(3)g and fy1(3); y2(4)g: Therefore, equilibrium cuto¤s are the solution to
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At b = 0:08; the only solution that gives numbers in [0; 1] is 1 = 0:0056; 2 = 0:015; 3 = 0:345 ;
and the actions induced for t = 1 and for t = 2 are respectively given by y1(1) = y2(1) = 0:00278;
y1(2) = 0:175; y2(2) = 0:0105, y2(3) = 0:18 and y1(3) = y2(4) = 0:673: This implies the following
total ex-ante expected utility for the expert  0:066; which is lower than 2( 0:033) =  0:0656: The
utility for the decision-maker is  0:053 which is lower than 2( 0:026) = 0:052:
This example illustrates that although the interval is divided into more subintervals here, both
players strictly worse o¤ compared to the one where the most informative static equilibrium is
played in the rst period and babbling thereafter. The feature that less partitions lead to higher
ex-ante welfare for both players also appears in example 1 of Blume, Board and Kawamura (2007).
D Proof of Theorem 1
We will prove by construction that a fully revealing equilibrium exists. We rst choose the endpoints
1; 2; 3 described in the proof outline: for any bias b < 161 ; dene a by







+ a ; 2 = 3   2; 1 = 2   3e 2 (9)
It will be convenient to describe types parametrically, via functions x : [ 2; 0] ! [0; 1]; g :
[ 2; 0]! [2; 3]; z : [a ; 0]! [1; 2]; and h : [a ; 0]! [3; 1b ]: Then, let u1(a; a); u2(a; a) denote
the rst, second recommendations of types x(a); g(a) (for all a 2 [ 2; 0]), and let v1(a; 0); v2(a; 0)
denote the rst, second recommendations of types (z(a); h(a)) (for all a 2 [a ; 0]): With this nota-
tion, Groups I,II, III described in the text are as follows:
Group I = fz(a); h(a) j a 2 [a ; 0]g
Group II = fx(a); g(a) j a 2 [ 2; 0]; and 9 a0 2 [a ; 0] with v1(a0; 0) = u1(a; a)g
Group III = fx(a); g(a)j a 2 [ 2; 0]; and x(a); g(a) =2 Group IIg
In our proposed equilibrium construction, each Group I pair fz(a); h(a)g recommends v1(a; 0) for
20 periods, then v2(a; 0) for T   20 periods, then reveals the truth at time T   ; each Group
II pair fx(a); g(a)g recommends u1(a; a) for 2a periods, then u2(a; a) for 2(1   a) periods,
then separates and reveals the truth at time T   2; and moreover, the recommendation u1(a; a)
coincides with the recommendation v1(a0; 0) of some Group I pair fz(a0); h(a0)g: Group III is
identical to Group II, except that their recommendations do not coincide with those of any Group
I pair.
We also specify the following o¤-path strategy for the expert: if the DM ever deviates, by
rejecting a recommendation that the expert made, then (i) if the expert himself has not previously
13 It is trivial to check exactly as we did in previous examples that these indi¤erence conditions su¢ ce for global
incentive compatibility.
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deviated: send no further recommendations (equivalently, repeat the current recommendation in
all subsequent periods). And (ii) if the expert has observably deviated in the past, behave as if the
deviation did not occur. (For example, if he sends the initial recommendation u1(0; 0) prescribed
for types fx(0); g(0)g; but then follows this with anything other than recommendation u2(0; 0) at
time 20; subsequently behave as if the deviation never occurred and he indeed sent u2(0; 0) at
time 20):
D.1 Optimality for the Expert
We prove that the expert wishes to follow the prescribed recommendation strategy via three propo-
sitions. Proposition D1 species strategies and beliefs for the DM such that the expert has no
incentive to send an out-of-equilibrium recommendation sequence, so we can restrict to making
sure that he does not wish to mimic any other type. Proposition D2 shows that in the prescribed
revelation phase, the expert indeed nds it optimal to reveal the truth, provided that there have
been no previous deviations. It remains only to show that the expert has no incentive to deviate
prior to the prescribed revelation phase - by mimicking the initial recommendations of some other
type - which we show in Proposition D3.
D.1.1 Expert Optimality: O¤-Path Behavior
We specify the following strategy and beliefs for the DM:
DM Strategy and Beliefs: If there are no detectable deviations by the expert (i.e., he sends the
equilibrium recommendation sequence for some type  2 [0; 1b ]), then follow all recommendations,
using Bayesrule to assign beliefs at each information set. Following deviations: (i) If the expert
observably deviates at time 0 (sending an o¤-path initial recommendation), subsequently adopt
the strategy/beliefs that would follow if the expert had instead sent the recommendation u1(0; 0)
prescribed for types fx(0); g(0)g; (ii) If the expert observably deviates on his 2nd recommendation
(i.e., if an initial recommendation u1(a; a) (or v1(a; 0)) is followed by something other than
u2(a; a) (or v2(a; 0)); ignore it as an error, and subsequently adopt the strategy/beliefs that
would follow had the deviation not occurred; (iii) If the expert deviates observably in the revelation
phase, ignore it as an error, assigning probability 1 to the lowest type in the current information
set, and accordingly choosing this as the myopically optimal action; (iv) And nally, if the DM
himself deviates, rejecting some recommendation by the expert, then he subsequently maintains
the current (at time of deviation) beliefs, anticipating that the expert will subsequently repeat the
current (at time of deviation) recommendation, and ignoring any other recommendations as errors.
Proposition D1: Under the above strategy and beliefs prescribed for the DM, the expert has no
incentive to choose an o¤-path recommendation sequence.
Proof of Proposition D1: Follows trivially from the specied strategy and beliefs for the DM:
(i) a deviation at time zero is equivalent to mimicking type x(0) (who recommends u1(0; 0) at time
t = 0); (ii) a deviation on the 2nd recommendation has no e¤ect, since the DM ignores it; (iii) a
deviation in the revelation phase, if there have been no previous recommendations, is equivalent to
mimicking the strategy of the lowest type in the DMs current (pre-revelation) information set; and
(iv) if the DM has previously deviated, then (by point (iv) of the above strategy-belief specication)
he will chose whichever action was myopically optimal at the time of deviation, regardless of the
experts message; therefore, babbling is optimal for the expert, since his message has no e¤ect on
the DMs action.
D.1.2 Expert Optimality: Truth Revelation Phase
Proposition D2: In the prescribed revelation phase, (i) if there have been no previous deviations
by the DM, then the expert nds it optimal to reveal the truth; (ii) if the DM has ever deviated,
then the expert nds it optimal to babble (eg. by remaining silent).
Proof of Proposition D2: Part (ii) follows immediately from Proposition D1 (iv). For part (i):
our specication of the expert strategy is such that at time 20; the DMs information set contains
at most two types: either a pair fx(a); g(a)g (in which case he plans to choose g(a) if the expert
24
recommends g(a); x(a) otherwise), or a pair fz(a); h(a)g (in which case he plans to choose h(a)
if the expert recommends it, z(a) otherwise). So, it su¢ ces to show that each type would rather
tell the truth than mimic his partner, which requires (in our rescaled state space) simply that all
paired types be at least 2 units apart. We have,
min
a2[ 2;0]
jg(a)  x(a)j = 2   1
min
a2[a ;0]
jh(a)  z(a)j = 3   2
By the endpoints specied at the beginning of this proof, 2   1 = (a   2 + 2e a )  8 (for
b < 161); and 3   2 = 2:
D.1.3 Expert Optimality: Initial Recommendations
Propositions D1,D2 imply that once the expert has sent the initial recommendation (u1 or v1)
prescribed for some type ; it is optimal to follow also the continuation recommendations prescribed
for that type. So, the only time when it could possibly be protable to deviate is at time t = 0 :
we need to make sure that each type  prefers to send the proposed equilibrium sequence of
recommendations, rather than the sequence prescribed for any other type 0:14 We now choose
parametrizations of functions x; g; z; h; along with action function u1; u2; v1; v2, which guarantee
that the expert indeed nds it optimal to send the prescribed initial recommendation:
Proposition D3: Let the action functions and type parametrizations be as follows:
x(a) = 3 + a  3ea; g(a) = 3 + a; z(a) =
1
b
+ a  2ea a ; h(a) = 1
b
+ a (10)






























































for constants Cu;K; and for now taking T; 0; a as given (T is the horizon, and a; 0 relate to
the duration of recommendations u1; v1 as described in the strategies above). Also set  (length of
the revelation phase for types in Group I) according to

T   2 =  
(2   1)(2   1   2)
(4   1)(4   1   2)
(15)
Then, for all types ; 0 2 [0; 1b ]; expert type  prefers his equilibrium recommendation sequence to
that sent by type 0; and in particular has no incentive to deviate at time t = 0 from the prescribed
strategy.
Proof of Proposition D3:
14This is what the text refers to as "providing incentives to join the right separable group. We need to make sure,
for example, that type  = 0 prefers to induce the action sequence (u1(0); u2(0); 0); rather than e.g. the sequence that
type 0 6= 0 is supposed to send; by Propositions D1,D2, the choice to follow a di¤erent recommendation sequence
can only be made at time t = 0:
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Let Du(0j) denote the disutility to type  from following the recommendation sequence pre-
scribed for a type 0 2 [0; 1][ [2; 3]; and let Dv(0j) denote the disutility to type  from following
the strategy prescribed for a type 0 2 [1; 2][ [3; 1b ]: The proof proceeds through two main Lem-
mas. Lemma D3.1 proves that the expert strategy is locallyincentive compatible: for each interval
[i; i+1]; i 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g; no expert type  2 [i; i+1] wishes to mimic any other type 0 2 [i; i+1]
from the same interval. Lemma D3.2 proves that the expert strategy is also globally incentive
compatible: no expert type wishes to mimic any type 0 from any other interval. The proofs will
use calculations obtained below in Lemmas D3.3 and D3.4.
Lemma D3.1 (Local IC): For each interval [i; i+1]; with i = 0; 1; 2; 3; and any pair of types
; 0 2 [i; i+1]; the disutility to type  from mimicking type 0 is (weakly) increasing in
0    ;
thus minimized when
0    = 0: Therefore, for each  2 [i; i+1]; truth-telling is (weakly) better
than mimicking any other type in the interval.
Proof of Lemma D3.1:








2(T   2) (x(a)     1)x0(a)  2(T   2) (g(a)     1) g0(a)
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= 0 + 2(T   2)
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3 + a  3ea      1 































Consider rst a type  2 [0; 1]: By (16) ; noting that 3e
a
3ea 1 > 0 (since 3e
a  3e 2 = 2 1 
8; by Proposition D2), we see that dDu(x(a)j)dx(a) has the same sign as (x(a)  ) : So if x(a)   > 0;
then Du(x(a)j) is increasing in x(a); thus increasing in (x(a)  ) ; while if x(a)    < 0; then
Du(x(a)j) is increasing in ( x(a)), thus increasing in    x(a): Combined, these establish that
Du(x(a)j) is strictly increasing in jx(a)  j ; as desired.





> 0 (since a 2 [a ; 0] implies
2ea a  2); we see that dDv(z(a)j)dz(a) has the same sign as z(a)   ; and is thus positive (disutility
increasing in z(a)   ) if z(a) > ; and negative (disutility increasing in    z(a)) if z(a) < :
Combined, these establish that Du(z(a)j) is strictly increasing in jz(a)  j ; as desired.
By (18) and (19) ; the disutility to type  from mimicking a type g(a) 2 [2; 3] or h(a) 2 [3; 1b ]
is independent of the particular type g(a); h(a) chosen. Thus, Du(g(a)j) is weakly increasing (in
fact constant) in jg(a)  j ; andDu(h(a)j) is weakly increasing (constant) in jh(a)  j, completing
the proof.
Lemma D3.2: For every interval [i; i+1] (i = 0; 1; 2; 3); and every  2 [i; i+1]; following the
prescribed (truthful) recommendation sequence is better than mimicking any type 0 drawn from
any other interval [j ; j+1] with j 6= i:
Proof of Lemma D3.2:
Consider rst a type  2 [0; 1]: By Lemma D3.1, truth-telling is better than mimicking any
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other type 0 2 [0; 1]; in particular type 1 = x( 2): By Lemma D3.4 (i) (below), type  2 [0; 1]
prefers type x( 2)s sequence to type z(0)s sequence; and by Lemma D3.1, it is better to mimic
type z(0) = 1; than any other type z(a) 2 (1; 2] (since z(a) >  implies that Dv(z(a)j) is
increasing in z(a)  ); together, these establish that mimicking a type 0 2 [1; 2] is not optimal.
By Lemma D3.4 (ii), type   2 prefers z(a)s sequence (right endpoint of [1; 2]) to g( 2)s
sequence (left endpoint of [2; 3]); and by Lemma D3.1, disutility to type  from mimicking type
g(a) 2 [2; 3] is independent of a; together, this implies that type  also does not want to mimic any
type g(a) 2 [2; 3]: And nally, by Lemma D3.4 (iii), type   2 prefers the sequence prescribed
for type g(0) (right endpoint of [2; 3]) to that prescribed for type h(a) (left endpoint of [3; 1b ]),
which (by Lemma D3.1) yields the same utility as mimicking any other type h(a) 2 [3; 1b ]; thus it
is not optimal to mimic any type h(a) 2 [3; 1b ]: This establishes that type  2 [0; 1] does not wish
to mimic any type 0 from any other interval.
Next consider type  2 [1; 2]: By Lemma D3.1, truth-telling is better than mimicking any
other type z(a) 2 [1; 2]; in particular type z(0) = 1; by Lemma D3.4 (i), type   1 prefers
the sequence prescribed for type z(0); to that prescribed for type x( 2); and by Lemma D3.1, it is
better to mimic x( 2) (right endpoint of [0; 1]) than any other type x(a) 2 [0; 1]; since Du(x(a)j)
is increasing in j   x(a)j and we have here  > x(a); together, this implies that type  does not
wish to mimic any type 0 2 [0; 1]: The proof that he doesnt wish to mimic any type g(a) 2 [2; 3]
or h(a) 2 [3; 1b ] is identical to the one given in the previous paragraph.
Now consider a type  2 [2; 3]: As explained in the previous two paragraphs, following the
truthful recommendation sequence yields the same utility as mimicking any other type g(a) 2
[2; 3] or h(a) 2 [3; 4]; so we just need to make sure that it is not optimal to mimic types
0 2 [0; 1] [ [1; 2]: By Lemma D3.4 (ii), type   2 prefers type g( 2)s sequence (left endpoint
of [2; 3]) to type z(a)s sequence (right endpoint of [1; 2]); by Lemma D3.1, type z(a)s
sequence is more attractive to type   2 than the one prescribed for any other (further-away)
type z(a) 2 [1; 2]; combined, this establishes that mimicking a type z(a) 2 [1; 2] is not optimal.
By Lemma D3.4 (i), it is better to mimic type z(0)s sequence than x( 2)s sequence, which in
turn is better (by Lemma D3.1) than any other type x(a)s sequence. Thus, it is not optimal to
mimic any type x(a) 2 [0; 1]; completing the proof for types  2 [2; 3]:
The argument that types  2 [3; 1b ] dont wish to mimic types from other intervals is identical
to the proof in the previous paragraph (for types  2 [2; 3]).
This completes the proof of Lemma D3.2.
D.1.4 Expert Optimality: Preliminary Calculations






0j) are given by
Du(x(a)j) = Du(g(a)j) + (T   2) (x(a)     1)2   (T   2) (g(a)     1)2 (20)
Du(g(a)j) = T (3      1)2 + 4K (3      1) + 2K2 + 2(T   2)Cu (21)




     1

(22)
Dv(h(a)j) = 2K2 + 2(T   2)Cu + 4 (3      1)K + T (   3 + 1)2 (23)
Proof of Lemma D3.3:
The disutility Du(g(a)j) to expert type  from following the strategy prescribed for type g(a) 2
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[2; 3], using (11) ; (12) ; is






















































+(T 2) (3 + a     1)2
If we now expand this expression, the coe¢ cients on a2; a reduce to zero (this is due to our choice
g(a) = 3 + a); leaving
Du(g(a)j) = 2 (3      1 +K)2 + 2(T   2)Cu + (T   2) (3      1)2
which rearranges to expression (21) :
The disutility to type  from following the strategy prescribed for type x(a) 2 [0; 1]; Du(x(a)j);
is given by (24) ; just replacing g(a) with x(a) : this gives the desired expression (20) :
The disutility to type  from following the strategy prescribed for type h(a) 2 [3; 4] is
Dv(h(a)j) = 20 (v1(a)     1)2 + (T      20) (v2(a)     1)2 +  (h(a)     1)2
Again, the coe¢ cients on the square root terms in v1; v2 were chosen to make both disutility and
average action independent of 0 : substituting (13) ; (14) into the above expression and expanding,
we get




T     

T    a     1
2














Substituting in h(a) = 4+ a; using 3 = 4+ a ; and expanding, we nd (this is due to our choice
h0(a) = 1) that the coe¢ cients on both a2; a reduce to zero, so that our expression simplies further
to (23) : Finally, using the fact that the strategies for types h(a); z(a) di¤er only in the revelation
phase, so
Dv(h(a)j) Dv(z(a)j) =  (h(a)     1)2    (z(a)     1)2
we obtain (22) : This completes the proof.
Lemma D3.4: (utility at the endpoints)
Under the expressions given in Proposition D3, we have that (i) at 1 = x( 2) = z(0) : type
 (weakly) prefers type x( 2)s recommendation sequence to z(0)s sequence i¤  2 [0; 1]; (ii) at
2 = z(a) = g( 2); type  prefers z(a)s sequence to g( 2)s sequence i¤  2 [0; 2]; and (iii) at
3 = g(0) = h(a); all types are indi¤erent between the sequences sent by types g(0); h(a):16
15Note that the coe¢ cients on the square roots were chosen to make this independent of a; as mentioned in
Appendix E - Derivations.
16For example, consider part (i). In our construction, type 1 is both the right endpoint x( 2) of the interval
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Proof of Lemma D3.4:
At 1 = x( 2) = z(0); we have (using the expressions in Lemma D3.3 and simplifying) that
Dv(z(0)j) Du(x( 2)j) equals
(T   2) (2   1) (1 + 2   2   2)   (4   1) (4 + 1   2   2)
Using (4   1) = (T   2) (2 1)(2 1 2)(4 1 2) (by (15)); this simplies to
Dv(z(0)j) Du(x( 2)j) = 2(T   2) (2   1) (4   2)

1   
4   1   2

(25)
This is negative, meaning that type  prefers z(0)s strategy to x( 2)s strategy, i¤  > 1; thus
establishing part (i).
At 2 = g( 2) = z(a); we have (by (22) and (21)
Du(g( 2)j) Dv(z(a)j) = (3   2) (3 + 2   2   2)
= 4 (2   ) (using 3   2 = 2) (26)
This is negative, meaning that type  prefers g( 2)s strategy to z(a)s strategy, i¤  > 2; proving
part (ii).
At 3; we have (by (21) and (23)),
Du(g(0)j) Dv(h(a)j) = 0 (27)
so that all types are indi¤erent between the strategies prescribed for type g(0) = 3; h(a) = 3;
as desired to complete the proof.
D.2 Optimality for the DM
Let the expert strategy be as specied in the previous subsection, using the action functions and
parametrizations from Proposition D3, with  = (T   2) as in (15) : Recall that we had the
following free parameters: constants K;Cu; the horizon T , a number 0 2 [0; 1]; and numbers
a 2 [0; 1] 8a 2 [ 2; 0]: We wish to show that the specied strategies constitute a fully revealing
PBE: since we established expert optimality in the previous section, and since the beliefs and o¤-
path strategies specied for the DM (see Proposition D1) trivially satisfy all PBE requirements, all
that remains is to prove that the DMs on-path strategy is optimal.
So, to prove Theorem 1, we just need to prove that we can choose K;Cu; 0; the as, and
a horizon T 17 such that whenever b < 161 ; there exist (many) priors  s.t. if the DM holds the
corresponding Bayesian beliefs at each information set, then he nds it optimal to follow all expert
recommendations (assuming no observable deviations).
Recall the following features of the expert strategy: at time t = 20; Group I and II pairs
separate, with Group I then revealing the truth at time T    ; pairs from Groups II and III
reveal the truth at time T   2: It is immediately clear that during the revelation phase, when
the experts recommendation is equal (with probability 1) to the true state, the DM indeed nds
it optimal to follow the recommendation. In between time 20 (when the DM learns whether the
state lies in Group I, II, or III) and the groups corresponding revelation time ( or T   2); no
new information is revealed, but rejecting any (on-path) recommendation by the expert will cause
the expert to subsequently babble rather than reveal the truth. So, the best possible deviation is
[0; 1]; and the left endpoint z(0) of the interval [1; 2] : part (i) says that type 1 is indi¤erent between the two
sequences prescribed for his type, and that everyone below 1 prefers the strategy of type x( 2); everyone above 1
prefers the strategy of type z(0):
17We prove here that there exists some T  that works; we can trivially extend the construction to hold for all
T  T ; as in the theorem, simply by beginning with a babbling phase.
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to choose the myopically optimal action in all subsequent periods. If such a deviation is optimal at
some time t; then it is optimal also prior to time t (when information is the same, but the reward
phase(following revelation of the truth) is further away). So, to prove that the DM does not wish
to deviate, it is su¢ cient to prove that deviating is not optimal at the earliest time at which new
information is revealed. We summarize this in the following observation:
Observation D4: If the DM cannot gain by deviating at time t 2 f0; 20g; then the prescribed
strategy is optimal.
So, we just need to prove that we can choose our free parameters such that (for a range of
priors and b < 161) the DM does not wish to deviate at time t = 0 or t = 20: We do so via three
main propositions. All three rely on calculations from Lemma D7.1 below, which shows that for
the constants K;Cu in (28) ; (29) and T     4, we can choose 0 and the as (with a  0 8a)
such that the range of v1(; 0) is contained in the range of u1 () : So every recommendation sent
by a Group I pair is also sent by a Group II pair, for at least as long. Taking these values as given,
Proposition D5 will prove that the DM has no incentive to deviate at time t = 20 if he gets a
message v2(a; 0) from a Group I pair, for a range of posteriors. Proposition D6 proves that with
these constants, there is a range of probability measures such that whenever b < 161 ; it is strictly
optimal for the DM to follow the prescribed recommendation at time t = 0 if the DM believes that
it came from any pair fx(a); g(a)g; which implies also that he does not wish to deviate at time
t = 20 if he realizes he is facing a Group II pair (again, we prove this for a range of posteriors).
It remains only to prove that there are innitely many priors  generating the Bayesian posteriors
in Propositions D5, D6, which we show in Proposition D7. This will complete the proof that we
have a fully revealing PBE.
D.2.1 Optimality for the DM: Deviations at time t = 20
Proposition D5: Suppose that the DM receives recommendation v2(a) at time t = 20; and














(T      20)
(29)
There exists a range of values for qa1 qa such that (i) whenever a
2
 < 8; we can choose a horizon T
such that the DMs strategy is strictly optimal in the limit as 0 ! 1; and (ii) whenever a2 > 8;
we can choose a horizon T such that the DMs strategy is strictly optimal in the limit as 0 ! 0:18
Proof of Proposition D5:
If the DM follows recommendation v2(a) (expecting to choose this action until time T    ; then
learn the truth); his expected disutility is
(T      20)

qa (v2(a)  z(a))2 + (1  qa) (v2(a)  h(a))2

+ (0)
The best possible deviation is to instead choose myopically optimal action qaz(a) + (1  qa)h(a) in
all remaining T   20 periods, for disutility
(T   2a)

qa (qaz(a) + (1  qa)h(a)  z(a))2 + (1  qa) (qaz(a) + (1  qa)h(a)  h(a))2

= (T   2)qa(1  qa) (h(a)  z(a))2
18Lemma D7.1 will show that we need only an upper bound on 0 for biases satisfying the condition a2 > 8 in
(ii), and a lower bound on 0 for biases satisfying a2 < 8; with  specied by (15), a
2
 > 8, a <  3:18:
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So to prove the Proposition, we need to show that there are qas s.t. the following inequality holds:
0 

qa (v2(a)  z(a))2 + (1  qa) (v2(a)  h(a))2

  (T   20)
(T      20)















  T   20
T      20
qa(1  qa) (30)




































T      20
(33)
Thus, a su¢ cient condition for the DMs IC constraint (30) to hold is





   1 (34)
which implies both that (32) holds (so the DM does not want to deviate), and that qa (from (31))






















+ 1    0) qa = 0
Substituting Cu = 1 00
K2





































k   ty +
q
k2 + (2   t) (2ky   ty2)
ey
where k  2KT  ; t 
T
T  ; and y  a a (with  dened in (33)): So by (34), we wish to show that
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for all y 2 [0; a ];
k   ty +
q
k2 + (2   t) (2ky   ty2)
ey
2 [   1;   1] (35)
By construction, the value of K specied in (29) sets the square root portion of v1; v2 equal to zero
at a = 0, y =  a (see Lemma D7.1), so we have
k = a





We rst prove (ii). Suppose a2 > 8; in which case Lemma D7.1 requires
T 
2  2; and 0  0
(for some 0 2 (0; 1)). Consider what happens as 0 ! 0 (in which case we trivially satisfy
0  0): then 2   t = T 20T  20  
T




k   ty +
q










k   ty +
q





 2y + (1  )ey

In the second line, the limit is clearly decreasing in y (noting that !
q
T
T  > 1); thus maximized
at y = 0 : here, the value is 1 ; the desired upper bound in (35). In the rst line, note that if we
set  s.t.
(+ 1)e > 2 , 1 > ln 
2
+ 1
,  < 3:4959
then the limiting expression ( 2y + (1 + )ey); which is minimized at y = ln 
2











which is positive, thus trivially satisfying the desired lower bound in (35). So, any  < 3:4959
satises (strictly) the DMs ex-post constraint in the limit as 0 ! 0; so by continuity the constraint
holds also for all 0 su¢ ciently close to zero. To complete the proof of (ii), we just need to show
that we can choose a horizon T; satisfying the requirement T 2    2 (from Proposition D6
and Lemma D7.1), which corresponds to 0 near zero and  < 3:4959:We have, recalling that (15)





0 ! 0) 2 !
  
(1  ) ( = t)
So we need
  






For  < :9182; the LHS of this inequality is negative, so the constraint  < 3:4959 does not bind.
For  > :9182; the constraint (34) requires   
1 (3:4959)2(1 ) ; together with the constraint   2
(from Proposition D6, Lemma D7.1), we obtain that for a2 > 8; the DMs strategy is optimal for
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if  > :9182
(36)
This completes the proof of (ii): for a2 > 8; if we set T according to (36) and 0 near zero,
then there exist posteriors (the qas) such that the DMs gain to deviating at time 20 is strictly
negative, at all information sets.
Finally we prove (i). Suppose a2 < 8; in which case Lemma D7.1 uses
T 
2   = 2 and





2(1  ) ; 
2 ! T   2
T      2 =
1









Dene f(y)  k   ty +
q
k2 + (2   t) (2ky   ty2); we want to prove that
 (1 + )  f(y)
ey
   1 for all y 2 [0; a ] (37)
To this end, note that
f 0(y) =  t+ (
2   t)(k   ty)q
k2 + (2   t) (2ky   ty2)
< 0 (by 2   t > 0; y > 0; and k < 0)
f 00(y) =
 (2   t)k22 




This implies that f(y) reaches a maximum (over y 2 [0; a ]) at y = 0, and lies above the straight
line connecting the points (0; f(0)) and ( a ; f( a)) : since we have f( a) = k+ ta (the square
root term is zero here by construction), and f(0) = k +
p
k2 = 0; this line ef is given by














; this becomes ef(y) =   1+q21 
!
y: Then, the upper bound









= 0    1





























So, using  = 1p
1  ; to show that miny2[0; a ]
f(y)








(1  )e + 1 +
r
1










Noting that the RHS is clearly increasing in ; it may be easily veried numerically that the
above expression holds for all   0:82035; which is implied by the range under consideration
(a   3:2)  < 0:8): This completes the proof for a   3:2, a2 < 8; showing that if we set
T = 4 21  ; then all DM IC constraints are slack in the limit as 0 ! 1 (and so, by continuity, hold
for all 0 su¢ ciently high, which satisfy the bounds in Lemma D7.1). This completes the proof.
D.2.2 Optimality for the DM: Deviations at time t = 0
Proposition D6: For all b < 161 , a   1:7726; and for all a 2 [ 2; 0]; there exists a range of
values pa such that if the DM assigns probabilities pa; 1   pa to types x(a); g(a); then his gain to
deviating at information set fx(a); g(a)g is strictly negative at any time t  0:
Proof of Proposition D6: As explained in Observation D4, it su¢ ces to prove that the gain to
deviating is negative at time t = 0: Substituting x(a) = 3 + a   3ea; g(a) = 3 + a; and Cu = 0
into (55) ; we obtain that the DMs gain to deviating at information set fx(a); g(a)g; if he assigns




















  Tp(1  p) (3ea)2
= 2K2 + 4K (p3e
a   a) + T (p3ea   a)2   (T   2)p(3ea)2 (38)




2K   Ta+ Tp3ea  
(T   2)p (3ea)2
(p3ea   1)
#
 2(p3ea   1) [2K   Ta  ((1  p)T   2)3ea] (39)
So, it su¢ ces to choose a value p s.t.










2   (T   2)p(3e 2)2  0 (41)
and then set p(a) = p for all a 2 [ 2; 0] : the rst inequality guarantees that the expression in (39)
is negative (so the DMs ex ante gain to deviating is decreasing in a; thus the gain is largest - so the
IC constraint is most di¢ cult to satisfy - at a =  2); the second inequality says that this maximal
gain, obtained by evaluating (38) at a =  2; is negative.
Suppose rst that a 2 [ 2; 1:7726]; and consider setting K =  4; p = 14 : in this case, (39) ;
and (38) at a =  2; become (respectively)
















x2 (T   2)  0, 8x (x  8)
3x  8  (x  8)T
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where x  3e 2 = a   2 + 2e a ; so, since x  8 , 8x3x 8  4; a su¢ cient condition for both
inequalities to hold is T  4 and x  8:
Next, suppose a   2. It is su¢ cient to show that both expressions (39) ; (38) hold at p = 12 ;
in which case (38) becomes
3e
 2  4









This implies also that 3e 2  4(K+T )T 4 ; so that (39) holds p =
1
2 . So, we just need to show that
(42) holds, which implies that the DMs gain to deviating at fx(a); g(a)g is largest at a =  2; and
satised at a =  2 (hence satised also for all a 2 ( 2; 0]). For this, we will use the notation from




T      20
; t =
T
T    ; =
T   
2








Suppose rst that a2 > 8 : for this range, we proved Proposition D5 using  < 2 and 0 ! 0
(which implies also that 2   t! 0; hence K ! 0); in which case (42) becomes











2T (T   2)
T   4
!
Rearranging to solve for T; we need T  4x2
x2 8x 16 ; with x  (a   2 + 2e
 a ); since
a2 > 8) a <  
p
8) x > 29) 4x
2
x2   8x  16 < 6
it follows that for large 0 and p near 12 ; ex ante incentive compatibility for the DM holds, at every
information set of the form fx(a); g(a)g; for any T  6:
Suppose next that a2 < 8 (and a   2) : for this range, we proved Lemma DM2 using
0 ! 1 and  = 2; in which case
T =
4  2
1   ; 
2 =
1
1   ; t =
2  














0@a 1 +r 2


+ 4  2 +












Here is a graph of the above expression for a 2 [ 3:2; 2] (using  = (a 2+2e
 a )(a 4+2e a )
2e a (2e a 2) ,
and noting that a2 < 8) a   3:2) :
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This completes the proof of Proposition D6, establishing that for every a 2 [ 2; 0] and every
a   2; there exists a value bp 2 (0; 1) s.t., using the parameters that satisfy Proposition D5 and
Lemma D7.1, , the DMs gain to deviating at information set fx(a); g(a)g is strictly negative if he
assigns probability bp to type x(a):
D.2.3 Optimality for the DM: Completing the Proof
As explained at the beginning of this section, it remains only to prove that there are many priors
 generating posteriors which satisfy the conditions in Proposiions D5, D6, which we prove here:
Proposition D7: For any continuous functions p : [ 2; 0] ! [0; 1]; q : [a ; 0] ! [0; 1]; and r :
[a ; 0]! [0; 1], there exists a probability measure  such that, in our construction, a Bayesian DM
will hold the following beliefs: (i) Pr (x(a)jfx(a); g(a)g) = p(a); (ii) Pr (z(a)jfz(a); h(a)g) = q(a);
(iii) Pr(fz(a); h(a)g j fz(a); h(a); x(ba); g(ba)g = r(a):
Proof of Proposition D7: Bayesian beliefs satisfy
Pr (x(a)jfx(a); g(a)g)





 = (x(a))(g(a)) (3ea   1)
Pr (z(a)jfz(a); h(a)g)





 =  (z(a))(h(a))  2ea a   1
Pr(fz(a); h(a)g)
Pr (fx(ba); g(ba)g) = (z(a))(bx(a)) p(ba)q(a) 2ea a   13eba(a)   1  1jba0(a)j
where ba(a) = u 11 (v1(a0)) (as explained in the section Derivations below). We want the rst
expression to equal p(a)1 p(a) , the second expression to equal
q(a)
1 q(a) , and the third expression to equal
r(a)




withM a constant to be determined (this assigns a probability to each type in [0; 1]). Then, assign
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Next, for each a 2 [a ; 0]; set (z(a)) to satisfy the 3rd bound above, i.e.
(z(a) =









(This assigns a prior to each type z(a) 2 [1; 2]). And similarly, now use this and the second
expression above to assign a prior to each type h(a) 2 [3; 4]: Finally, choose M so that the
total measure of the type space integrates to 1 (This is possible since (11) ; (13) imply that u1; v1
and their derivatives w.r.t. a are nite and non-zero except perhaps at a single point a; from
which it follows that jba0(a)j is nite (again, except perhaps at a single point a)): Therefore, all our
measures (x(a)); (g(a)); (z(a)) are nite numbers divided by M ; so, integrating over the state
space results in a nite number divided by M: Choose M so that this number equals 1.



















 ; 1  (T      2) s 1








\ [0; 1] 6= ;; with 0 < 0 whenever a2 > 8; and 0 > 1
whenever a2 < 8; (ii) 0 2 [0; 0] implies that ut; vt are both real-valued, and (iii) 0 2 [0; 0]
implies that for every a 2 [a ; 0]; there exists a pair (ba(a); (a)); with (a)  0 and ba(a) 2 [ 2; 0];
such that
u1(ba(a); (a)) = v1(a; 0)
Proof of Lemma D7.1: We rst prove (i). Note that
T    <
a2
2








) 0 < 0










) 0 > 1
So, a2 > 8 implies that we need only verify that 0 > 0; while if a
2





and (T   ) 2 [1; 4]) (T      2)2  (T   ) < 2(T   )










































is implied by a   1:7726)   :4172 and   2: This establishes (i).
Now for (ii) and (iii): with Cu as specied by (28) ; the equations in (11) ; (12) become



















v1(a; 0)  3 =








2K (a  a)  T2 (a  a)
2

T    (44)
We rst prove (ii). To show that v1 () is real-valued, note that the term in square roots
is decreasing in a (derivative w.r.t. a has the same sign as 2K   T (a   a); which is negative by
K < 0 and a  a); so we just need to show that minimum value, which is at a = 0; is non-negative:
that is, we need
0  T      20
0




The value ofK specied in (29) is precisely the negative root of this equation, so the above inequality
holds by construction. For u1 () to be real-valued, we need
0  1  0
0








The 2nd term is either minimized at a = 0 (in which case the expression clearly holds), or at
a =  2; in which case it holds (for K < 0) i¤
















(T      20)








(T      20)
 T (1  0)p







+ (T   20)
q
T 
2 + 0(T   2)

(2nd line obtained from 1st by (i) replacing  with (T   2) in the LHS numerator; (ii) mul-







 ; and nally (iii) on the resulting RHS, multi-




















+ (T   20)
q
T 
2 + 0(T   2)
 = T (1  0)
(T   20 + 0(T   2))
q
T 
2 + 20(T   2)

Therefore, to prove the desired inequality, it is su¢ cient to show that the following holds:
( a)
(T      20)
 T
(T   20 + 0(T   2))
q
T 
2 + 20(T   2)

, 0 














The RHS is precisely the value 0 dened in the Lemma, so 0  0 is su¢ cient to guarantee that
ut () is real-valued. This completes the proof of (ii).









































K2 + 0T  20 












2K (a  a)  T2 (a  a)
2
3
Clearly the second expression is positive, so we have that











=  1 + ( K)p
K2
= 0
That is, v1 () is strictly increasing on [a ; 0]; with













T    =
K
0
vmax1   3 = v1(0; 0)  3 =















So we immediately have vmin1 = u1(0; 0): To show that v
max
1  u1( 2; 1); we need to show that
K + T   2  2K + a
T    ,
(T      2)
(T   2) K >
a
T   2   (T   )
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(T  20) , using  = (T   2); and dividing by a








(T      20)
>













For this, it is su¢ cient to prove the following (which replaces the 2nd numerator term on the LHS












Multiplying both sides by (1  )(T      20), this rearranges as
(T      2)
r
 (T   )
2
  (T      20)
(T   )
 a
<  (T   ) (1  0)
Replacing the LHS with the upper bound at 0 = 1; and dividing through by (T   ); we obtain
the following su¢ cient condition:
0  1  (T      2)
 s
1




The RHS is precisely the value 0 dened in the Lemma: that is, 0  0 implies that [vmin1 ; vmax1 ] 
[u1(0; 0); u1( 2; 1)]; which, by continuity, implies that for every a 2 [a ; 0], v1(a) 2 [vmin1 ; vmax1 ];
there exists ba(a) 2 [ 2; 0] and a  0 s.t. v1(a; 0) = u1(ba(a); a): This proves (iii).
E Appendix E: Derivations
In this section, we explain how the functions and parameters in our fully revealing construction
were chosen.
E.1 For the Expert:
Suppose we wanted an equilibrium in which each type  2 [0; 1] pools with a type g() 2 [2; 3];
to recommend an action u1() in period 1, u2() in period 2, and then reveal the truth at time










0)     1
2
+ (T   2)
 

















In order for this to be an equilibrium, it must be that Du(0j) reaches a minimum over [0; 1] at
0 =  (so that type  earns a lower disutility by telling the truth than by mimicking any other type
0 in the interval [0; 1]), and that Du(g(0)jg()) reaches a minimum at g(0) = g(): We can do
this by simply choosing functions that satisfy the corresponding rst- and second-order conditions:
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= u01() (u1()  g()  1) + u02()(u2()     1)  (T   2)g0()(47)





(g()  ) = (T   2)(1  g0())
If we dene a()  ln g() g(1) 1 ; so that a
0() = g
0() 1
g()  ; this becomes
u01() + u
0
2() =  (T   2)a0()) u1() + u2() = ku   (T   2)a(); ku a constant (48)
Now: the disutility from telling the truth is





= (u01()  1) (u1()     1) + u02() (u2()     1)
Substituting (46) into this expression, we get
D0u()
2
= T   2  (u1() + u2()) + 2( + 1)
= T + 2   ku + (T   2)a() (by (48) )
Integrating w.r.t. ; we get




Setting u1(0)  u0 and using expression (48) to obtain u2(0) = ku  (T   2)a(0)  u1(0) = ku  u0;
this becomes
Du() = (u0   1)2 + (ku   u0   1)2 + (T   2)| {z }
Du(0)














     1
2
+ 2 (T   2) + 2(T   2)
Z 
0
a(0)d0 + (T   2)
It will be convenient to change variables: rather than describing g as a function from [0; 1] !
[2; 3]; and using a()  ln g() g(0) 0 ; we ipvariables, describing each type  2 [0; 1] as a para-
metric function x(a) of the variable a; and each type in [2; 3] as a parametric function g(a) of
the variable a; where a takes on all values between 0 and a1 = ln
g(1) 1
g(0) 0 , and g(a); x(a) hold the








noting that  =
R a
0 x







+ 2(T   2)
Z a
0




T 2 may be any non-negative constant. Setting this equal to type x(a)
0s truth-
telling disutility (evaluate (49) at  = x(a)), using u2(a) = k   (T   2)a   u1(a) (from (48)); and



















with u2(a) = ku   (T   2)a  u1(a): Evaluating this at x(a) = 3 + a  3ea and ku2 = K + 3 gives
precisely our expression u1(a; a) in (11) evaluated at a = 12 ; the expressions in (11) ; (12) were
rescaled (via the coe¢ cients on the square roots) such that both disutility and average actions
are independent of a:
















0)  0   1












This implies that a su¢ cient condition for truth-telling to indeed yield a minimum on disutility is




is positive for any 0 >  (as type  contemplates mimicking types 0 further above him,
disutility increases, making him worse o¤), and negative for 0 <  (as he moves further below the
truth, disutility increases, also making him worse o¤), but zero at 0 =  : thus, telling the truth is
better than mimicking any other type in the interval.
To sum up, this has shown that given arbitrary interval endpoints 1; 2; 3; functions x :
[a1; 0] ! [0; 1] and g : [a1; 0] ! [2; 3]; and with a1  ln g(a1) x(a1)g(0) x(0) = ln
2 1
3 0 and g(a)  x(a) =
3e
a; if we want an equilibrium in which types x(a); g(a) recommend u1(a) for one period, then
u2(a) for one period, then separate and reveal the truth, then truth-telling satises the F.O.C. for
disutility minimization i¤ u1; u2 are as specied by (51) and u2(a) = ku   (T   2)a   u1(a): If
we additionally impose the requirement that average action be increasing in type, then we satisfy
also the S.O.C.s; this requires that each of x0(a); g0(a) is either negative or  1: Analogously, for
arbitrary functions z : [a ; 0] ! [1; 2]; h : [a ; 0] ! [3; 4]; with a = ln h(a) z(a)h(0) z(0) =
3 2
4 1 and
h(a)   z(a) = (4   1)ea; if we want an equilibrium in which types z(a); h(a) recommend v1(a)
for T 2 periods, then v2(a) for
T 
2 periods, then separate and reveal the truth, the F.O.C.s for



















with v2(a) = kv   2T  a  v1(a); kv and Cv constants. And the S.O.C.s, guaranteeing that truth-
telling indeed yields a disutility minimum over the interval, reduce to the requirement that each
of z0(a); h0(a) is either negative or  1: The proof that no expert type wishes to deviate after the
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initial recommendation follows almost trivially from the prescribed strategies.
It remains to show that no expert type wishes to mimic the initial recommendation of any
type from any other interval. This reduces to the additional requirements that at each endpoint
i 2 f1; 2; 3g; the average action is non-decreasing at i (if discontinuous), and type i is indif-
ferent between the two sequences that he can induce. Our construction chooses the specic para-
meterizations g(a) = 3 + a and h(a) = 4 + a, with x(a) = g(a)  3ea; z(a) = h(a)  (4   1)ea:
Then we have x0(a) = 1  3ea  1  3e 2; z0(a) = 1  2ea a   1; and g0(a) = h0(a) = 1; which
clearly satisfy the S.O.C.s (provided that 3e 2  2; we in fact will restrict to 3e 2  8): With
this, the expressions in (51) ; (52) become (with K  ku2   3)





























We chose a1 =  2 and g0(a) = 1 because this is in fact the only way that the indi¤erence constraint
at 2 can hold simultaneously with both the indi¤erence constraint at 3; and the increasing-
average-action requirement at 2: We chose h0(a) = 1 just for simplicity. With it, the remaining
increasing-average-action constraints do not bind, and the indi¤erence conditions reduce to the
following requirements on the relationships between kv; Cv;  (parameters from the vt-functions)
and ku; Cu; T (parameters from the ut-functions):














T   2 =  
(2   1)(2   1   2)
(4   1)(4   1   2)
With this, the expressions in (53) ; (54) simplify exactly to the expressions for u1(a; a) in (11) and
v1(a; 0) in (13) ; at a = 12 ; 0 =
T 
4 ; in Proposition D3, we then rescaled (11) ; (13) for other
values of a; 0 in such a way that incentives are not a¤ected.
E.2 For the DM:
Suppose the DM receives the recommendation u1(a; a) in period 1. If he assigns probabilities
(pa; 1  pa) to types x(a); g(a); then his disutility from following all recommendations is
pa





2a (u1(a; a)  g(a))2 + 2(1  a) (u2(a; a)  g(a))2

Substituting in the expression for u1(a; a),u2(a; a) from (11) ; (12) ; and expanding, this becomes
2pa




















The best possible deviation is to choose the myopically optimal action pax(a) + (1  pa)g(a) in all
T periods, resulting in disutility
Tpa (pax(a) + (1  pa)g(a)  x(a))2 + T (1  pa) (pax(a) + 1  pa)g(a)  g(a))2
= Tpa(1  pa) (g(a)  x(a))2
Therefore, incentive compatibility of our strategies for the DM refers that the following expression
(the gain to deviating at fx(a); g(a)g) be weakly negative for all a 2 [ 2; 0] :
2pa




















  Tpa(1  pa) (g(a)  x(a))2
Substituting in g(a) = 3+a; x(a) = 3+a  3ea and solving for K; we obtain that the DMs gain


















For there to exist a value of K which satises this expression, we need (a) to be real-valued, i.e.




















which in turn is possible (for some belief system) to satisfy only if 3  8e2: For our construction,






 a + 2 + 3e 2
  1:7726, b  1
60:885
That is, it is possible to satisfy the DM IC constraints in a straightforward manner only if the bias
satises b  160:885 ; which is why our construction species b <
1
61 :
Similarly, if the DM receives the recommendation v1(a) in period 1 and assigns probabilities
qa; 1  qa to types z(a); h(a); his maximum gain to deviating is
qa





20 (v1(a; 0)  h(a))2 + (T      20) (v2(a; 0)  h(a))2

  Tqa(1  qa) (h(a)  z(a))2
Recalling that the expressions in (13) ; (14) were scaled to make the above expression independent
of 0; we can without loss of generality set 0 = 1; in which case v1 is given by (54) ; and v2 =
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  Tqa(1  qa)(h  z)2 (57)
Setting h(a) = 4 + a; z(a) = 4 + a  (4   1)ea = 4 + a  2ea a and solving for kv2 ; we obtain













e(a); 4 + a  qa  2ea a+r 2
T   
e(a)#
where e(a)  r1
2




This constraint by itself is problematic. To understand the di¢ culty, note that at a = a ; there
exists a value of kv satisfying the above expression only if e(a) is real-valued, requiring
2qa(1  qa + a) 
a2
2
  Cv  0
We showed in the previous paragraph that the IC constraints at information sets of the form
fx(a); g(a)g can only hold if a   1:7726; in this case, the rst term in the above inequality is
negative (since we need qa  0 and 1 + a < 0); the second term is clearly negative, and the third
must be negative (i.e. we need Cv  0) in order for the functions v1; v2to be real-valued at a = 0:
Therefore, if the DM nds it optimal to follow all recommendations sent by pairs fx(a); g(a)g;
then he necessarily will have an incentive to deviate if his information set contains only types
fz(a); h(a)g = f2; 3g:
To solve this problem, we will bunchpairs - scaling our action functions such that whenever the
DM would have an incentive to deviate after a recommendation v1(a) sent by a pair fz(a); h(a)g;
he believes that the recommendation v1(a) is also sent (for the same length of time) by a pair
fx(a0); g(a0)g; and such that the expected benet to following the recommendation (likelihood that
it was sent by the pair (x(a0); g(a0)); times the gain to following the recommendation conditional
on this pair), exceeds the cost to following the recommendation (which is the likelihood that it was
sent by pair (z(a); h(a)); times the benet to deviating conditional on this pair).
E.2.1 DM: Bunching and Beliefs
Our incentive constraints for the DM were specied in terms of arbitrary probabilities pa; qa; which
in turn depend both on his prior (the measure  over the state space [0; 1]), and on the precise
details of our construction. We assume that the DM is Bayesian: if he believes that the experts
rst-period messages are given by a function M : [0; 1]! R; with the property that
M(x) =M(p(x))
for all x in some interval [x; x]  [0; 1]; and p : [x; x] ! [0; 1]n[x; x] some continuous di¤erentiable
function (i.e., types x and p(x) are partnerswho follow the same messaging strategy), then, after








This says that the likelihood of type x relative to p(x) is equal to the unconditional likelihood
ratio (determined by the prior ); times a term which depends on the shape of the p-function, in
particular due to its inuence on the size of the interval of p-types compared to the size of their
partner interval, [x; x] : To understand this formula, consider an example in which  is uniform and
p () is linear, say p(x) =  + x: In this case, the interval [p(x); p(x)] is  times as large as the
interval [x; x] ; so intuitively, it is as if the message sent by type x is sent by  copies of type
p(x) : therefore, the DMs beliefs assign  times as much weight to type p(x) as to type x; which
is precisely what our formula says. Beliefs are assigned analogously after period 1.
For our particular construction, our belief formula in (58) becomes:










 =  (x(a)) (g(a)) (3ea   1)










 =  (z(a)) (h(a))(2ea a   1)









so, denoting bI(ba) = fx(ba); g(ba)g and I(a) = fz(a); h(a)g (with a 2 [a ; 0] and ba(a) dened
by u1(ba(a); a) = v1(a; 0)), and I(a) = bI(ba)[ I(a); the DMs beliefs at the pooled (4-type)
information set I(a) satisfy
P 

















!ba0(a)   qa
pa

(with pa; qa as dened in the rst two bullet points; the nal term in the rst line numerator
is 1 + 1 papa =
1
pa




By bunching, we mean that we will create the 4-type information sets described in the third
bullet point above. More precisely, we choose the parameters 0; a to make sure that the range of
v1 is contained in the range of u1; so that any initial recommendation sent by a pair fx(a); g(a)g is
also sent by a pair fz(a); h(a)g (see Lemma D7.1).
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